This online appendix contains supplemental results to the paper. It is organized as follows. Table OA1 presents estimates of changes in CEO pay and the sensitivity of CEO pay to firm performance around the passage of SoP laws after controlling for both one-year lagged and current firm performance, and CEO age and tenure. Table OA2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used to measure the strength of corporate governance and problematic pay practices. Table   OA3 reports additional information about the excess pay calculation and robustness of the results in column 2 of Table 3 of the paper to alternative calculations of excess pay. Panel A provides summary statistics, Panel B reports results from regressions that are used to estimate excess pay, and Panel C reports estimates of changes in the level of CEO pay and the sensitivity of CEO pay to firm performance around the passage of SoP laws using alternative definitions of excess pay. Table OA4 presents estimates of changes in the sensitivity of CEO pay to firm performance around the passage of SoP laws separately for subsamples based on the compensation structure, the strength of corporate governance, and shareholder dissent. Table OA5 presents results from robustness tests for the matched sample in Table 5 . Panel A presents results from an instrumental variable estimation about changes in CEO pay, CEO pay gap, and firm valuation around the passage of SoP laws. Panel B presents estimates of changes in CEO pay, CEO pay gap, and firm valuation under different subsamples and various controls around the passage of SoP laws. Table OA6 presents estimates of changes in CEO pay, the sensitivity of CEO pay to realized firm performance, CEO pay gap, and firm valuation around voluntary SoP regimes and Table OA7 reports the results around binding and advisory SoP laws. Table OA1 .
Controlling for Present and Past Firm Performance
This table presents estimates of changes in chief executive officer (CEO) pay and the sensitivity of CEO pay to firm performance around the passage of SoP laws after controlling for both one-year lagged and current firm performance, and CEO age and tenure. Firm performance is measured by industry-adjusted stock returns. We only report the key coefficient estimates for brevity but all columns include control variables from Table 2 in the paper. Table A1 in the paper provides variable definitions and data sources. We winsorize all continuous variables at the one percent level and use one-year lagged values of time-varying independent variables. The t-statistics appear in brackets below parameter estimates. Robust standard errors are estimated by clustering at the country and firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Variables
(1) (2) Table 3 of the paper to alternative calculations of excess pay. Panel A provides summary statistics for variables used in excess pay estimation. Panel B reports results from regressions that are used to estimate excess pay. Panel C reports estimates of changes in the level of chief executive officer (CEO) pay and the sensitivity of CEO pay to firm performance around the passage of SoP laws using alternative definitions of excess pay. In Panel B, column 1 reports results from the regression that is used in column 2 of Table 3 in the paper. Column 2 adds the natural logarithm of the firm's market capitalization as an additional independent variable. Column 3 estimates the regression specification of the previous column based on observations from the pre-SoP law period for countries that eventually pass SoP laws during the sample period as well as observations from the countries that never pass SoP laws in the sample period. In Panel C, column 1 reports results based on excess pay calculation from column 2 of Panel B where the natural logarithm of the firm's market capitalization as an additional independent variable. Column 2 reports results where excess pay is estimated in separate samples by country and also includes the natural logarithm of the firm's market capitalization.
Column 3 reports results based on the excess pay calculation from column 3 of Panel B, where observations from the countries that never pass SoP laws are included in excess pay calculations and the natural logarithm of the firm's market capitalization is added as an additional independent variable for excess pay calculations. Column 4 reports results based on excess pay that is calculated based on the average values of excess pay obtained from year-by-year regressions. Table  A1 in the paper provides variable definitions and data sources. We winsorize all continuous variables at the one percent level and use one-year lagged values of time-varying independent variables. The t-statistics appear in brackets below parameter estimates. Robust standard errors are estimated by clustering at the country and firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Table OA4 .
Subsample analysis
This table presents estimates of changes in the sensitivity of chief executive officer (CEO) pay to firm performance around the passage of SoP laws separately for subsamples based on the compensation structure, the strength of corporate governance, and shareholder dissent. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of total annual CEO compensation (total CEO pay). We put firms that are to be subject to SoP laws into two subgroups based on the compensation policies and the strength of corporate governance in the pre-SoP period. Subsample 1 reports the coefficient estimates on the double interaction term between the SoP law dummy and firm performance for firms with problematic pay practises and weak governance policies. Subsample 2 reports the coefficient estimates for firms with relatively sound pay practises and strong governance policies. Each column represents results from a regression specification that includes all the independent variables in the regression specification in column 3 of Table 2 in the paper as control variables. All columns include country * year fixed effects. All variable definitions are provided in Table 3 , Table 5 , and Table A1 in the paper. We winsorize all continuous variables at the one percent level and use one-year lagged values of time-varying independent variables. The t-statistics appear in brackets below parameter estimates. Robust standard errors are estimated at the country and firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. This table presents estimates of changes in chief executive officer (CEO) pay, the sensitivity of CEO pay to realized firm performance, CEO pay gap, and firm valuation around voluntary SoP regimes. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of total annual CEO compensation in the first two columns, the natural logarithm of the difference between CEO pay and the median value of total annual pay among the top five managers in the third column, and the industry-adjusted natural logarithm of Tobin's Q in the final column. In Panel A, voluntary SoP regime is a country-level indicator variable that equals one for countries that allow for voluntary SoP regimes, and zero otherwise.In Panel B, voluntary SoP regime is a firm-level indicator that represents firms that hold shareholder votes on executive pay on a periodical basis in absence of SoP laws. The sample is limited to firms for which information about voluntary SoP regime adoption could be gathered. We only report the key coefficient estimates for brevity but all columns include control variables from the corresponding previous tables. Table A1 in the paper provides variable definitions and data sources. We winsorize all continuous variables at the one percent level and use one-year lagged values of time-varying independent variables. The t-statistics appear in brackets below parameter estimates. Robust standard errors are estimated by clustering at the country and firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. This table presents estimates of changes in chief executive officer (CEO) pay, the sensitivity of CEO pay to realized firm performance, CEO pay gap, and firm valuation around the passage of binding and advisory SoP laws. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of total annual CEO compensation in the first two columns, the natural logarithm of the difference between CEO pay and the median value of total annual pay among the top five managers in the third column, and the industry-adjusted natural logarithm of Tobin's Q in the final two columns. Binding (advisory) SoP laws require (do not require) the board of directors to address shareholder disapproval of executive pay. Binding SoP laws also include the comply-or-explain SoP laws in the Netherlands. We only report the key coefficient estimates for brevity, but all columns include the corresponding control variables from the previously reported corresponding tables. The H 0 provides p-values of the joint Wald test that the sum of coefficients on binding SoP laws equal the sum of coefficients on advisory SoP laws. Table A1 in the paper provides variable definitions and data sources. We winsorize all continuous variables at the one percent level and use one-year lagged values of time-varying independent variables. The t-statistics appear in brackets below parameter estimates. Robust standard errors are estimated by clustering at the country and firm level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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